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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the dynamic effect of social and political instability on 
output. Using a panel of up to 183 countries from 1980 to 2010, the results of the paper 
suggest that social conflicts have a significant and negative impact on output in the short-
term with the magnitude of the effect being a function of the intensity of political instability. 
The results also show that the recovery of output over the medium-term depends on the 
ability of the country to implement, in the aftermath of a social instability episode, reforms 
aimed at improving the level of governance. The results are robust to different checks and 
estimation strategies.  
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1. Introduction 
For a long time, economists and social scientists have produced a large body of literature 
attempting to uncover the effects of political instability on a country’s economic 
performance, especially with regards to output and growth. Recently, the sequence of 
political and social events dubbed ―the Arab spring‖ has raised new concerns amongst 
scholars and institutions about the effects of the resulting political unrest on the growth 
outlook of the directly involved countries and, more broadly, of the Middle-Eastern and 
Northern-African (MENA) regions. Ongoing protests and demonstrations across the region 
have already resulted in (often violent) regime changes in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya and Yemen, and their detrimental effects on output growth and broader economic 
activity are readily visible. But, for how long will said effects last? 
Rather than occasional and rarely occurring, political instability is a widely spread 
and recurrent phenomenon around the World. Figure 1 below illustrates this by displaying 
the average number of major cabinet changes (a milder form of political instability) across 
different geo-political regions in recent times (1980 through 2006). As can be observed, the 
value for this indicator is rarely equal to zero and is actually high in some instances (e.g. 
Central and Eastern Europe in 1989). This certainly points at said variable as a good proxy 
for overall social and political instability, and motivates us to extensively use it in this study.  
At a theoretical level, political instability and economic growth are interrelated at 
various levels. In fact, this relationship has not been established as unidirectional since it is 
possible that both are jointly determined. In one direction, we have that, for instance, the 
uncertainty associated with political instability has a direct impact on economic growth via 
deterred investment in physical capital, loss of human capital due to e.g. migration, volatility 
of fiscal and monetary policies leading to high inflation, etc. In the opposite direction, 
unsatisfactory economic performance and high degrees of inequality may lead in turn to 
social and political unrest derived from a country’s people’s grim expectations about future 
(and current) economic opportunities. 
Empirically, several studies have attempted to shed light on the degree to which 
political instability and economic growth interact with each other. In general, it has been 
found that political instability indeed: i) leads to lower economic growth (Alesina et al., 
1996; Jong-A-Pin, 2009; Aisen and Veiga, 2013); ii) reduces investment made by the private 
sector (Rodrik, 1991; Barro, 1991; Alesina and Perotti, 1996); iii) increases inflation levels 
and volatility (Cukierman et al., 1992; Aisen and Veiga, 2008); amongst other adverse effects 
on the economy. 
There is a gap, however, in the literature with regards to the dynamic effects of 
political instability on economic growth, and this paper attempts to fill that gap. In particular, 
we study the effects of instability on growth over the medium term (rather than just the 
contemporaneous or short-term effects), paying particular attention to their dynamics. 
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Amongst our main results, we find that the adverse effects of instability on output start to 
vanish after only 2-3 years (depending on the specific measure of instability we consider), 
leaving the medium-term effects as practically null on average. We find, however, 
differentiated effects across countries, depending on their ability to implement reforms that 
improve governance: countries that reform within 2-3 years following a conflict episode 
show a higher output growth rate in the medium term, while the opposite occurs to countries 
that do not implement reforms. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we discuss the data, its 
sources, and some descriptive statistics. We present our empirical analysis in Section 3, 
discussing both the short- and medium-term effects of political instability on output growth, 
as well as the role of political reforms. Finally, Section 4 concludes and presents some 
implications for policy. 
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
This paper considers a panel of annual data for up to 183 countries spanning from 1980 to 
2010. Data for social conflicts and political instability indicators are obtained from several 
sources. First amongst our sources is the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS), 
made available by Databanks International (Banks, 2011), which contains a vast array of 
political, economic, social, and demographic variables for nearly every country in the World 
dating back as far as 1815 in many cases. In particular, the CNTS dataset provides 
information on the occurrence of: (a) cabinet changes; (b) government crises; (c) 
assassinations; (d) general strikes; (e) guerrilla warfare; (f) purges; (g) riots; (h) revolutions; 
and (i) anti-government demonstrations. 
The second source is the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) dataset, which covers 
several variables aimed at assessing and explaining political instability and potential state 
failures around the World. Overall, ten different indicators of social instability are considered 
in the analysis:4  (i) cabinet changes (CC); (ii) government crises (GC); (iii)-(v) three 
different indicators of regime instability obtained using principal component analysis of 
different groups of indicators;  (vi) general strikes (GS); (vii) antigovernment demonstrations 
(DE); (viii) a composite measure of social instability obtained using principal component 
analysis of indicators (b)-(i) described above; (ix) a composite measure of social instability 
(WI) computed as a weighted average of the CNTS indicators (b)-(i); and (x) an indicator of 
adverse regime change.  
With regards to the other variables (macroeconomic, demographic, governance, and 
market regulations) used in the empirical analysis, the sources of the data are the IMF’s 
World Economic Outlook (WEO), the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), 
                                                 
4
 See Annex for details. 
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the Penn World Table (PWT version 7.0) by Heston et al. (2011), the World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) described in Kaufmann et al. (2010), and the Fraser Institute’s Economic 
Freedom of the World (EFW) report of 2010. The full list of variables, definitions and 
sources is provided in the Annex. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the social conflict indicators, as well as for 
the macroeconomic and demographic variables used in the paper. For the cabinet changes 
(CC) indicator we have a total of 4,549 observations, ranging from a minimum of 0 to a 
maximum of 5. For the other social conflict indicators we also have a high number of 
observations, ranging from 4,448 (for the Regime Instability Index 3, RI3) to as many as 
5,856 (for the Adverse Regime Change indicator, AD). As for real GDP per capita (our 
dependent variable), we have up to 5,081 observations, with values going from a minimum 
of $117.6 to a maximum of $159,144.50.5 
The evolution over time of the average number of major cabinet changes (CC) across 
regions is depicted in Figure 1. It is interesting to note that, for the whole sample, cabinet 
changes across regions display a high degree of co-movement, with pair-wise correlations 
being all positive6 and as high as 0.52 (excluding correlations of individual regions with the 
whole World, which tend to be high by construction). If we restrict the sample to exclude the 
1980s, we observe that co-movements between individual regions are even stronger, with 
pair-wise correlations being as high as, for instance, 0.70 between cabinet changes in Sub-
Saharan Africa and Central and Eastern European countries. 
Figure 2, likewise, depicts the co-movement over time between the different social 
instability indicators considered in this paper for the full sample of countries. Also in this 
case we can observe a tendency in these indicators to co-move with each other. For the full 
period under consideration, we observe that pair-wise correlations are all positive and as high 
as, for instance, 0.96 between Cabinet Changes and the Regime Instability Index 1,7 or 0.56 
between Cabinet Changes and Government Crises. If we consider the subsample starting in 
1990, we observe that such behavior in the indicators remains qualitatively unchanged, and 
in some cases the correlations are even stronger. This surely hints towards the importance of 
considering multiple, alternative measures of social and political instability, while at the 
same time maintaining robustness in our results. 
                                                 
5
 Real GDP per capita is expressed in constant PPP international dollars of 2005. The maximum in our sample 
corresponds to Qatar in 2009. 
6
 Except for that between the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Advanced Economies, which is -
0.03. 
7
 This high correlation is not surprising, though, given that CC is used in the construction of RI1. 
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One of the most widely used indicators of political instability is the number of major 
cabinet changes (CC), and the existing literature has tried to measure and assess its effects on 
economic growth (Alesina et al., 1996; Aisen and Veiga, 2013). The empirical evidence of 
previous studies in the literature has in general pointed out to a negative association between 
social instability and contemporaneous growth. This negative relation is confirmed by Figure 
3. However, if we extend the analysis over the medium-term (7 years after the occurrence of 
a social instability episode), it seems that social instability and changes in real GDP are not 
correlated (Figure 4). It is important, therefore, to distinguish between short and medium-
term effects of political instability and social conflict on economic growth. This will be the 
focus of the next section. 
3. Empirical Analysis  
This section analyzes the impact of social instability on output. The first part of the section 
assesses the effect of social instability on contemporaneous growth. The second part of the 
section extends the analysis to the medium term, analyzing the dynamic response of output to 
social instability up to 8 years following its occurrence. The third part assesses the role of 
reforms, in the aftermath of an episode of social instability, in shaping the effect of social and 
political instability on output.  
3.1 Short-term 
Following previous studies in the literature on the short-term effects of social and political 
instability on output, the methodological approach used in the paper consists of regressing 
contemporaneous output growth against an indicator of instability which takes discrete 
values according to the number of episodes of social instability occurred and 0 otherwise, 
and a set of variables influencing short-term growth. In particular, the formal specification of 
the empirical model used for the short-term analysis is as follows: 
                                                                         (1) 
 where, for each country i at time t,      is the log of real GDP,     is a measure of social and 
political instability,   are country-specific effects included to account for different growth 
trends among countries and to control for time invariant variables which may affect growth 
in the short-term (Durlauf et al., 2005),     is a set of variables influencing growth in the 
short-term, and the coefficient  represents the effect of social and political instability on 
growth.  The empirical literature on growth has suggested numerous variables as possible 
determinants of growth (see, for example, Levine and Renelt, 1992; Sala-i-Martin 1997, 
Sala-i-Martin et al. 2004). However, some of these variables are likely to influence growth 
only over the medium–term, and are not available on a yearly basis (e.g., human capital) over 
a long time span and for a large set of countries. Therefore, in order to keep the specification 
parsimonious, the variables included in the vector X have been restricted to: investment 
prices, trade openness (defined as the share of total exports and imports in GDP), population 
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growth, and (the log of) initial GDP. In addition, given that the main concern is to introduce 
relevant control variables into the regression, so that the estimated impact of social instability 
on output is not biased due to the omission of variables, two lags of real GDP growth and a 
time trend have been included in the specification. 
  Table 2 shows the estimation results. To control for the fact that the error term in 
equation (1) may be serially auto-correlated within countries, the variance and covariance 
matrix has been estimated using the clustered sandwich estimator.  Column 1 shows a 
benchmark growth regression in which political instability is measured by the number of 
cabinet changes (Alesina et al., 1996; Aisen and Veiga, 2013). The coefficient associated 
with cabinet changes is negative and statistically significant at 1%, and suggests that an 
additional cabinet change is associated with a reduction in real GDP growth of about 1 
percentage point. Among the control variables, we find that the initial level of GDP, the 
lagged output growth and time trend are the ones that are statistically significant in most of 
the specifications. The results are robust across different sets of controls and to the exclusion 
and inclusion of country and time fixed effects.  
 To check for the robustness of the results, we re-estimated equation (1) also excluding 
each region at a time. The results displayed in Table 3 show, also in this case, that an 
additional cabinet change is associated with a reduction in real GDP growth of about 1 
percentage point. Interestingly, our point estimate is smaller (in absolute value) when MENA 
or Sub-Saharan (SSA) countries are excluded from the sample, which indirectly suggests that 
the effect may be even more detrimental for these regions. 
Given that social instability is a multi-dimensional phenomenon which eventually 
goes beyond the number of cabinet changes, we also consider in the analysis the remaining 
nine indicators of political instability (described above). In sum, the ten indicators of political 
instability under consideration are:8  (i) cabinet changes (CC); (ii) government crises (GC); 
(iii)-(v) three different indicators of regime instability obtained using principal component 
analysis of different groups of indicators (RI1-RI3);  (vi) general strikes (GS); (vii) 
antigovernment demonstrations (DE); (viii) a composite measure of social instability 
obtained using principal component analysis of the CNTS indictors (b)-(i); (ix) a composite 
measure of social instability (WI) computed as a weighted average of the CNTS indicators 
(b)-(i); and (x) an indicator of adverse regime change.  
 The results in Table 4 show that the negative and significant effect of social 
instability on contemporaneous growth is robust across all different indicators. Interestingly, 
however, the results also suggest an intuitive ranking of the indicators in terms of their effect 
on growth: on the one hand, strikes and antigovernment demonstration have the lowest effect 
(0.3-0.6 percentage points) while, on the other hand, adverse regime changes display the 
                                                 
8
 See Annex for details. 
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largest effect (7 percentage points). The control variables that have a statistically significant 
effect remain being the time trend, the initial level of GDP and the first lag of real GDP 
growth. 
 One problem in estimating equation (1) with OLS is that the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable and country fixed effects may in principle bias the estimation of   in 
small samples (Nickel, 1981), although the large number of time periods in our analysis 
mitigates this concern9. In addition, social instability may be endogenous to output growth 
leading to inconsistency of the OLS estimates. To address these concerns, equation (1) has 
been re-estimated using the two-step system-GMM estimator, where the indicator of social 
instability has been treated as endogenous10. The results, presented in Table 5, confirm that 
social instability has a significant impact on contemporaneous growth. Also in this case, 
while strikes and antigovernment demonstration have the lowest effect (0-0.2 percentage 
points), adverse regime changes have the largest effect (7 percentage points).11 
 Overall, the results confirm previous evidence in the literature suggesting that social 
instability has detrimental effects on growth in the short term, with the magnitude of the 
effect being function of the intensity of political instability. 
3.2 Medium-term 
In order to estimate the medium-term dynamic impact of social instability episodes on 
output, the paper follows the method proposed by Jorda (2005) and Teuling and Zubanov 
(2010) which consists of estimating impulse response functions (IRFs) directly from local 
projections. 12 In detail, for each future period k the following equation has been estimated on 
annual data: 
              
        
           
  
                     
                                    (2) 
where   
  are country fixed effects, Timeit are country-specific time trends, Xit is the set of 
controls described in the previous section, and    measures the impact of social instability on 
the change of (the log of) real output for each future period k = 1,…,8. Since fixed effects are 
                                                 
9
 The finite sample bias is in the order of 1/T, where T in our sample is 31. 
10
 The two-step system-GMM estimates (with Windmeijer standard errors) are computed using the xtabond2 
Stata command developed by Roodman (2009). Social instability and all control variables are considered as 
endogenous (instrumented using up to 2 lags). The time trend is considered as predetermined. The significance 
of the results is robust to different choices of instruments and predetermined variables. 
11
 Consistency of the two-step GMM estimates has been checked by using the Hansen and the Arellano-Bond 
tests. The Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments by 
analyzing the sample analog of the moment conditions used in the estimation process, cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the full set of orthogonality conditions are valid. The Arellano–Bond test for autocorrelation 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced error terms. 
12
 See, for example, Furceri and Zdzienicka (2010, 2012a, 2012b) for recent applications of this approach. 
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included in the regression the dynamic impact of social instability on output should be 
interpreted as changes in output compared to a baseline country-specific output trend.  
The number of lags (l) has been chosen to be equal to two, even when the results are 
extremely robust to different number of lags included in the specification. Corrections for 
heteroskedasticity, when appropriate, have been applied using White robust standard errors. 
Impulse response functions are then obtained by plotting the estimated    for k= 0,1,…,8, 
with 95% confidence bands being computed using the standard deviations associated with the 
estimated coefficients   .  
The results from estimating the medium-term impact of social instability (proxied for 
by cabinet changes) on output using equation (2) are presented in Figure 5. The figure 
suggests that the statistical significance of the effect of social instability on output vanishes 
after only 2 years. The effect over the medium term is considerably smaller than the 
contemporaneous effect and not statistically significant. 
To check the robustness of our results, equation (2) has been re-estimated by 
alternatively including a common time trend, time fixed effects, and country-specific time 
trends (Panels B-D, Figure 6). The results using these different specifications remain 
statistically significant and broadly unchanged.  
Additionally, we have also re-estimated equation (2) excluding each region at a time. 
The results show, also in this case, that the effect of social instability on growth is not 
statistically significant over the medium term (Panels B-H, Figure 7). In particular, in most of 
the sub-samples the effect becomes insignificant after only 2 years of the occurrence of the 
social instability episode. An exception is for the results obtained with the sub-sample 
excluding Sub-Saharan countries. In this case, the effect is statistically significant up to 3 
years after the occurrence of such an episode.  
 As a further robustness check, we have tested the sensitivity of our results to different 
parameterizations of the lag structure in equation (2). While from a technical point of view 
the number of lags (l) does not have direct effects on the computation of the IRFs, which is 
based only on the coefficients  
 
 
, different lag structures can indirectly affect the IRFs only 
to the extent that additional lags are correlated with the explanatory variables. To address this 
issue we have repeated the analysis for different lags. The results -not presented here- show 
that while the medium-term effect across different specifications ranges from -1.1 percentage 
points (two lags) to -0.1 percentage points (six lags), the point estimates are not statistically 
different from each other. Similar results are also found for the effect computed at different 
time horizons (k), and different social instability indicators. 
Finally, the medium-term results are extremely robust when the k equations are 
jointly estimated. In particular, while the estimated coefficients are identical to those reported 
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in the baseline, the t-statistics obtained with the joint estimation procedure, although 
moderately smaller, remain statistically insignificant.  
As shown by Teulings and Zubanov (2010), a possible bias from estimating equation 
(2) using country-fixed effects is that the error term of the equation may have a non-zero 
expected value, due to the interaction of the fixed effects and the country-specific arrival 
rates of social instability episodes. This would lead to a bias of the estimates that is a function 
of k13.  In order to address this issue and to check for the robustness of our results, equation 
(2) has been re-estimated by excluding country fixed effects from the analysis. However, the 
results (reported in Panel E of Figure 6) suggest that this bias is negligible, as the difference 
in the point estimate is small and not statistically significant, and confirm the empirical 
evidence that the medium-term effect of social instability on output is not statistically 
different from zero.  
In addition, in order to control for possible ―dynamic panel bias‖ due to the presence 
of country fixed effects and the lagged dependent variables, equation (2) has been re-
estimated also using the two-step system-GMM estimator. Also in this case, the results 
suggest that the statistical significance of the effect of social instability on output vanishes 
over time (Panel F, Figure 6). 
Finally, in order to control for different dimensions and indicators of social 
instability, equation (2) has been re-estimated for all of the indicators analyzed in the 
previous section. Figure 8 shows the response associated with the indicators that produce the 
largest difference in the IRFs. The results, also for the indicators not shown in Figure 8, 
confirm that the medium-term effect of social instability on output is not statistically 
different from zero. 
3.3 The Effect of Reforms  
The results presented in the previous section have shown that, on average, social instability 
does not have a significant medium-term effect on output. However, it is possible that the 
response of output to social instability over the medium term depends on the ability of a 
country to implement reforms in the aftermath of an episode of instability. Indeed, it is 
reasonable to expect that the social instability episode is the result of discontent of the 
population with the current regime, and that the change in regime has as main objective to 
improve institutional governance that boosts inclusive growth. 
                                                 
13
 Assuming that social instability has a negative effect on output, the bias would be negative. 
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In order to test the hypothesis that governance reforms affect the dynamic response of 
output to social instability, the following empirical model is estimated: 
              
        
           
  
                             
                  (3) 
where     is an indicator of reforms in governance constructed as the change in a composite 
measure of governance in the two (or three) years following the social instability episode.  
The composite governance indicator is obtained applying the principal component 
analysis to the six governance indicators described in Kaufmann et al. (2010): i) Voice and 
Accountability, ii) Political Stability, iii) Government Effectiveness, iv) Regulatory Quality, 
v) Rule of Law, and vi) Control of Corruption. 
  The reason to focus on the two- (or three-) year change instead of the one-year 
change is due to the fact that reforms are identified using only a posteriori information. 
Indeed, reforms tend to be implemented and reflected in changes in the indicators only with 
some lag from when they are decided. In addition, the use of a longer lag length may allow 
this procedure to capture gradual reforms that are protracted over time. 
 The response of output to social instability conditioning for the implementation of 
reforms in institutional governance is displayed in Figure 9. The figure presents the average 
response and the responses obtained considering the first and third quartile of the distribution 
of the two- (or three-) year change in the composite governance indicator.  In order to 
highlight the statistical significance of the results, the lines corresponding to the first and 
third quartile in the figures are marked with ―‖ when the interaction term and the overall 
impact are statistically significant at least at a 10 percent confidence level. Looking at the 
figure, it clearly emerges that the medium-term response of output to social instability is a 
function of the countries’ ability to implement governance reforms in the aftermath of a 
social instability episode.  In particular, while output remarkably increases compared to the 
pre-crisis level in countries where governance reforms are implemented in the two (or three) 
years following the instability episode, it significantly contracts in countries where 
institutional governance has deteriorated.  The results are robust to all the different 
specifications and checks presented in the previous section. 
In order to control for different dimensions and indicators of social instability, 
equation (3) has been re-estimated for all indicators analyzed in the previous section. While 
the results for the great majority of indicators are very similar to those obtained for cabinet 
changes, for adverse regime changes the effect of reform on shaping the response of output to 
social instability is significantly magnified, particularly for those reforms occurred within 
three years of the occurrence of the adverse regime change (Figure 10, panel B). 
Estimates of the impact of governance reform could be biased because of endogeneity 
of the reforms. In particular, while potential reverse causality is addressed by estimating 
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changes in GDP in the years that follow a social conflict and the adoption of governance 
reforms, it could still be the case that unobserved factors influencing the dynamics of GDP 
over time could affect the probability of a reform. To address this endogeneity issue, we have 
instrumented change in the governance indicator with a set of political variables which can 
be considered as strictly exogenous. In detail, the set of instruments consists of: 
(i ) parliamentary system (presidential vs. parliamentary); (ii) the number of veto players who 
drop from the government in any given year; (iii) the initial level of the governance indicator; 
and (iv) lagged changes in the governance indicators.14 From a theoretical point of view, 
while the initial level of the governance indicator is likely to be correlated with changes in 
output, political variables (political system and the number of veto players) can be considered 
strictly exogenous. In addition, the test of joint significance suggests that these political 
variables can be considered as strongly exogenous.15 The results obtained by instrumenting 
the two- and three-year change in the governance indicators confirm that, over the medium-
term (five years after the occurrence of the social instability episode16), the effect of social 
conflict on output is positively related with the change in the governance indicator 
(Figure 11). 
As a robustness check, we have repeated the analysis controlling for other types of 
reforms. Indeed, since several types of economic reforms are often implemented 
simultaneously, it is important to distinguish the effect of governance reforms from others. 
For this purpose, we have considered two other types of reform: (i) a product market reform, 
and (ii) a labor market reform. These are key in boosting productivity and raising potential 
growth (Bouis and Duval, 2011). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the response of 
output to social instability over the medium-term may depend on the ability of a country to 
implement reforms in those sectors. While the results obtained with these additional reforms 
still confirm that the medium-term response of output to social instability is a function of 
change in governance, they also show that reforms in product and labor market regulation 
have a significant impact over the medium-term, even though their effect is considerably 
lower than reforms directly improving a country’s governance (Appendix). 
  
                                                 
14
 Other political variables which feature prominently in the empirical literature—such as election cycles, 
political ideology, government fractionalization, measures of political stability, and the presence of a 
constitutional limit on the number of years the executive can serve before new elections—have been tested but 
proved to be statistically insignificant.  
15
 The Chi-square test of the null hypothesis of joint significance is 13.23, which is higher than the critical value 
(10) suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) for strong instruments. The Hansen J-statistics and the Kleibergen-
Paap Wald type F-statistics also validate the exogeneity of the instruments. 
16
 Given limited data on political variables we were not able to extend the analysis for 6 and 7 years ahead. 
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3.3.1 Governance and probability of political instability 
The previous section has shown that reforms aimed at improving the level of governance 
significantly affect the recovery of output over the medium-term. A natural question is then 
whether countries characterized by better quality of governance are also more resilient to 
episodes of political and social instability.  
To test for this hypothesis, we have estimated a Probit model where the probability of 
social and political instability episodes is regressed against the initial level of governance and 
a set of control variables which feature prominently in the social and political science 
literature.  In particular, the set of control variables include: (i) a measure of political 
polarization; (ii) a measure of government fractionalization; (iii) the share of seats of the 
opposition parties; (iv) a measure of degree of centralization (e.g. going from a presidential 
system to one in which the president is elected by the assembly; (v) a measure of margin of 
the majority (defined by the fraction of seats held by the government); (vi) an indicator of 
autocracy; and to assess non-linearity in the type of autocratic regime (vii) a dummy which 
takes value equal 1 for regimes at the center of the autocracy distribution (partial autocracy). 
Table 6 presents the results obtained by regressing the probability of cabinet changes 
and adverse regime changes on the variables discussed above, and displays the marginal 
coefficient estimates computed at the sample mean. Starting with cabinet changes, it can be 
noted that countries with initial better quality of governance have, on average, a lower 
probability to enter an instability episode. In particular, an improvement of one standard 
deviation of the governance indicator (equal to 2.2) decreases the probability of a cabinet 
change by about 3 percent (column III). Since the unconditional probability of the occurrence 
of a cabinet change is about 37 percent, the results imply a 9 percent increase in the 
probability of cabinet changes. Among the control variables, we find that the probability of 
cabinet changes increases with the level of political fractionalization and decreases with the 
margin of majority and the level of autocracy. Across different specifications the number of 
cabinet changes correctly specified ranges from 67 to 75 percent.  
The results for adverse regime changes also show that the initial level of governance 
plays a significant role. In particular, an improvement of one standard deviation of the 
governance indicator (equal to 2.2) decreases the probability of a cabinet change by about 0.6 
percent (column VI). Since the unconditional probability of the occurrence of an adverse 
regime change is about 2 percent, the results imply a 30 percent increase in the probability of 
an adverse regime change. Interestingly, this result suggests that the effect of governance is 
considerably larger for adverse regime changes than for cabinet changes. These results, taken 
together with those of the previous section, suggest that the quality of governance plays a key 
role in reducing the probability of the occurrence of instability episodes, particularly adverse 
regime changes, and their medium-term effects on output. 
13 
 
 
Among the control variables, we find that the probability of adverse regime changes 
decreases with the level of autocracy, but this relation is non-linear as countries at the center 
of the autocracy distribution are characterized by a larger probability. Similar results have 
been found by Bates et al. (2010), which show that partial autocracy is significantly 
correlated with a higher probability of adverse regime changes. Across different 
specifications the number of adverse regime changes correctly specified ranges from 81 to 83 
percent.  
3.3.2 Governance, induced political instability and growth 
As shown in the previous section, the probability of instability episodes, particularly adverse 
regime changes, is significantly and negatively related with the initial level of governance. A 
natural extension of the analysis of the effect of adverse regime changes on growth is then to 
test the role of the part of instability that is induced by the level of governance. Thus, in order 
to evaluate the importance of the initial level of governance, we first construct a fitted value 
of the probability of adverse regime changes based on the Probit regression with the initial 
level of governance, and then we regress this fitted value -the part of probability of adverse 
regime changes induced by the level of governance- on output growth. The results, reported 
in Table 7, show that social instability induced by the level of governance has a strong 
negative effect on growth, and the magnitude of the effect is significantly larger than those of 
the baseline (columns II and III). This result is robust across different specifications of 
equation (1), and to the inclusion of autocracy and partial autocracy in the first stage 
regression.  
Additionally, we also test whether the induced effect of adverse regimes change is 
robust to the inclusion of the initial level of governance as a control in the second stage 
regression. The results in column III of Table 7 show that while the initial level of 
governance has a direct effect on growth that is not channeled through the probability of 
adverse regime changes, the effect of the part of the probability of adverse regime changes 
induced by the level of governance is still negative and statistically significant.  
Finally, by decomposing the effect of adverse regime changes in the induced and non-
induce part, the results confirm that the induced effect of adverse regime changes is 
considerably larger than the non-induced component (column IV). 
4. Conclusions and Policy Implications  
Using a novel and comprehensive cross-country panel dataset, this paper contributes to the 
empirical literature on the effects of social conflict and political instability on economic 
growth in various ways. First of all, our results confirm the negative short-term effect of 
political instability on contemporaneous output growth documented by several previous 
studies in the literature. Secondly, with methods and results new to the literature, this paper 
shows that said detrimental effects of instability on growth are not likely to persist if we 
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extend the time horizon of analysis over the medium-term, as they vanish after only 2-3 years 
following an episode of conflict. 
Thirdly, we present evidence indicating that the medium-term effect of political 
instability and social conflict on output growth is differentiated across countries, depending 
on their ability to implement reforms that improve governance within the first 2-3 years in 
the aftermath of an episode of conflict. More specifically, countries that improve their levels 
of governance after periods of conflict experience, over the medium-term, output growth that 
is significantly higher than in those countries that do not improve their governance. 
Interestingly, the same conclusions can be drawn, although to a lesser extent, regarding 
structural reforms aimed at improving the product and labor markets. To be sure, this finding 
is strong evidence in favor of the importance of the adequate policy reaction following an 
episode of political instability. 
Lastly, we also present evidence that the probability of instability episodes, 
particularly adverse regime changes, is significantly and negatively related with the initial 
level of governance.  
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Annex-Data Description 
The dependent and control variables included in the analysis belong to one of several 
categories, namely: 
1) Output 
 GDP per capita (rgdpl in the WEO dataset, y in this paper): Purchasing power parity 
(PPP) converted GDP per capita (with the Laspeyres methodology), derived from growth 
rates of private consumption, government expenditures, and investment at 2005 constant 
prices. 
2) Social conflict indicators 
 Major cabinet changes (polit11 in the CNTS dataset; CC in this paper): The number of 
times in a year that a new premier is named and/or 50% of the cabinet posts are assumed 
by new ministers. 
 Changes in Effective Executive (polit12 in the CNTS dataset): The number of times in a 
year that effective control of executive power changes hands. Such a change requires that 
the new executive be independent of his predecessor. 
 Coups d'État (polit03 in the CNTS dataset): The number of extra constitutional or forced 
changes in the top government elite and/or its effective control of the nation's power 
structure in a given year. The term "coup" includes, but is not exhausted by, the term 
"successful revolution". Unsuccessful coups are not counted. 
 Major Constitutional Changes (polit04 in the CNTS dataset): The number of basic 
alterations in a state's constitutional structure, the extreme case being the adoption of a 
new constitution that significantly alters the prerogatives of the various branches of 
government. Examples of the latter might be the substitution of presidential for 
parliamentary government or the replacement of monarchical by republican rule. 
Constitutional amendments which do not have significant impact on the political system 
are not counted. 
 Legislative Election (polit15 in the CNTS dataset): The number of elections held for the 
lower house of a national legislature in a given year. A limited number of by-elections are 
included, but most are not. 
 Party fractionalization index (polit01 in the CNTS dataset): This index is based on a 
formula proposed by Douglas Rae (1968), and is constructed as follows: 
, 

F  1 t i 
2
i1
m

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where  is the proportion of members associated with the ith party in the lower house of 
the legislature (where there are no parties, a zero is entered). 
In calculating the Index entries, independents are disregarded and legislative changes 
between elections are not taken into account. It should also be noted that sources vary on 
the distribution of seats (and even the overall number of seats) for many countries; thus 
figures calculated by different researchers may vary. 
 Assassinations (domestic1 in the CNTS dataset). Any politically motivated murder or 
attempted murder of a high government official or politician. 
 General Strikes (domestic2 in the CNTS dataset). Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial 
or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national 
government policies or authority. 
 Guerrilla Warfare (domestic3 in the CNTS dataset). Any armed activity, sabotage, or 
bombings carried on by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the 
overthrow of the present regime. 
 Major government crises (domestic4 in the CNTS dataset; GC in this paper): Any rapidly 
developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present regime, excluding 
situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow.  
 Purges (domestic5 in the CNTS dataset). Any systematic elimination by jailing or 
execution of political opposition within the ranks of the regime or the opposition. 
 Riots (domestic6 in the CNTS dataset). Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 
100 citizens involving the use of physical force. 
 Revolutions (domestic7 in the CNTS dataset). Any illegal or forced change in the top 
government elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed 
rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government. 
 Anti-government Demonstrations (domestic8 in the CNTS dataset). Any peaceful public 
gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their 
opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly 
anti-foreign nature. 
 Weighted index of political instability (domestic9 in the CNTS dataset; WI in this paper): 
This is a weighted conflict measure, with the specific weights for different conflicts being 
the following: Assassinations (25), Strikes (20), Guerrilla Warfare (100), Government 
Crises (20), Purges (20), Riots (25), Revolutions (150), and Anti-Government 
Demonstrations (10).  

t i
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 Adverse regime change (AD in this paper): Indicator (dummy = 1) variable for an adverse 
regime change episode in the PITF dataset. 
The following composite indicators are the result of a principal component analysis (PCA) of 
several groups of individual indicators. For each composite measure, we choose the first 
component based on Cattell’s scree plot test: 
 Principal component indicator of political instability (labeled PC in this paper): Includes 
the indicators domestic1 through domestic8 from the CNTS dataset. 
 Composite measure of political instability (JAP in this paper): Includes the measures of 
political instability obtained by Jong-A-Pin (2009), when the ICRG data are not used. 
Furthermore, the following measures (obtained also by PCA) correspond to the groups of 
indicators suggested by Aisen and Veiga (2013): 
 Regime instability index 1 (labeled RI1 in this paper): This measure includes the 
indicators Cabinet Changes (polit11) and Executive Changes (polit12) from the CNTS 
dataset.  
 Regime instability index 2 (labeled RI2 in this paper): This measure includes the 
indicators Cabinet Changes (polit11), Constitutional Changes (polit04), Coups (polit03), 
Executive Changes (polit12) and Government Crises (domestic4) from the CNTS dataset. 
 Regime instability index 3 (labeled RI3 in this paper): This measure includes the 
indicators Cabinet Changes (polit11) and Executive Changes (polit12) … Cabinet 
Changes (polit11), Constitutional Changes (polit04), Coups (polit03), Executive Changes 
(polit12), Government Crises (domestic4), Number of Legislative Elections (polit15), and 
Fragmentation Index (polit01) from the CNTS dataset. 
 Violence index (labeled VI in this paper): This measure includes the indicators 
Assassinations (domestic1), Coups (polit03), and Revolutions (domestic7) from the 
CNTS dataset. 
3) Macroeconomic and demographic controls 
 Price of investment (PI, from PWT): Price level of investment (in logs). 
 Openness (Open, from PWT): (log) Openness at 2005 constant prices, in percent. 
 Population growth (Popg, series SPPOPGROW from WDI): Population growth (annual 
percent rate). 
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4) Governance and regulation indicators 
 Governance (WGI, from Kaufmann et al. 2010): Composite measure of the six 
governance indicators described in Kaufmann et al. (2010): Voice and Accountability, 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. These indicators are 
aggregated by means of PCA, from which we choose the first component (with the 
highest associated eigenvalue). 
5) Political indicators 
 System (DPI, from Beck et al. 2001): parliamentary (value equal to 2); assembly-elected 
president (1); president (0). 
 Polarization (DPI, from Keefer and Stasavage 2003): maximum difference between the 
chief executive’s party’s value and the values of the three largest opposition parties. 
 Government fractionalization (DPI, from Beck et al. 2001): probability that two deputies 
picked at random from among the government parties will be of different parties. 
 Margin majority (DPI, from Beck et al. 2001): fraction of seats held by the government. 
 Opposition’s share (DPI, from Beck et al. 2001): total vote share of opposition parties. 
 Autocracy (Polity IV Project):  level of government autocracy. 
The following indicators are composite measures for the quality of regulations on product 
and labor markets, provided by the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) 
report 2010. The index ranges between 0 and 10, with higher scores being assigned to 
economies with better (more flexible) regulations: 
 Business/product markets (area5c, from EFW): Composite index for the quality of 
business and product market regulations, based on the following sub-components: Price 
controls, Administrative requirements, Bureaucracy costs, Cost of starting a business, 
Extra payments / bribes, Licensing restrictions, and Cost of tax compliance. 
 Labor markets (area5b, from EFW): Composite index for the quality of labor market 
regulations, based on the following sub-components: Hiring regulations and minimum 
wage, Hiring and firing regulations, Centralized collective bargaining, Hours regulations, 
Mandated cost of worker dismissal, and Conscription. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics  
 Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Output and 
Macroeconomic/Demographic 
Controls      
Real GDP 5,081 9,780.3 12,431.7 117.6 159,144.5 
Price of investment 5,081 4.0 0.7 -24.1 6.7 
Openness 5,081 4.2 0.6 2.0 6.1 
Population growth 5,445 1.7 1.6 -44.4 12.8 
      
Social Conflict Indicators      
Cabinet changes (CC) 4,549 0.5 0.6 0.0 5.0 
Government crises (GC)  5,276 0.1 0.4 0.0 5.0 
Weighted index of political instability 
(WI) 
5,271 768.2 1,571.5 0.0 2,1250 
Principal component indicator of 
political instability (PC) 
5,271 0.0 1.5 -0.8 18.2 
Regime instability index 1 (RI1) 4,549 0.0 1.2 -0.8 10.6 
Regime instability index 2 (RI2) 4,522 0.0 1.4 -0.9 14.6 
Regime instability index 3 (RI3) 4,448 0.0 1.5 -1.1 14.1 
General strikes (GS) 5276 0.1 0.5 0 7 
Antigovernment demonstrations (DE) 5275 0.5 1.5 0 26 
Adverse regime change (AD) 5,856 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 
Sources: PWT, WDI, WEO, CNTS, PITF and Jong-A-Pin (2009). 
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Table 2. The contemporaneous effect of social conflicts on output-OLS 
 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X) 
St -0.011 
(-
3.87)*** 
-0.011 
(-
3.75)*** 
-0.012 
(-
3.95)*** 
-0.012 
(-
3.95)*** 
-0.011 
(-
3.91)*** 
-0.013 
(-
4.48)*** 
-0.011 
(-
3.87)*** 
-0.012 
(-
3.93)*** 
-0.011 
(-
3.83)*** 
-0.011 
(-
3.64)*** 
           
yt-1 -0.077 
(-
4.35)*** 
-0.078 
(-
4.33)*** 
-0.007 
(-0.46) 
-0.005 
(-
0.32)*** 
-0.071 
(-
3.71)*** 
-0.074 
(-
4.55)*** 
-0.077 
(-
4.50)*** 
-0.075 
(-
3.98)*** 
-0.077 
(-
4.46)*** 
-0.057 
(-
4.15)*** 
yt-1 0.094 
(1.89)* 
0.081 
(1.62)* 
0.133 
(2.55)*** 
0.123 
(2.32)* 
- 0.107 
(2.09)** 
0.094 
(1.88)* 
0.094 
(1.88)* 
0.097 
(1.97)** 
0.099 
(2.02)* 
yt-2 0.022 
(0.61) 
0.022 
(0.60) 
0.043 
(1.26) 
0.046 
(1.29) 
0.026 
(0.65) 
- 0.022 
(0.61) 
0.021 
(0.60) 
0.022 
(0.62) 
0.023 
(0.61) 
IPt -0.001 
(-0.14) 
-0.006 
(-0.65) 
-0.001 
(-0.46) 
-0.002 
(-0.98) 
-0.002 
(-0.18) 
0.002 
(0.29) 
- 
 
-0.001 
(-0.15) 
-0.001 
(-0.11) 
-0.008 
(-1.18) 
Opent 0.013 
(1.16) 
0.012 
(1.01) 
0.004 
(1.36) 
0.004 
(1.21) 
0.004 
(1.12) 
0.012 
(1.04) 
0.013 
(1.15) 
- 0.013 
(1.13) 
0.032 
(3.40)*** 
Popgt 0.000 
(0.12) 
0.000 
(0.08) 
-0.004 
(-1.58) 
-0.004 
(-1.58) 
0.001 
(0.25) 
0.000 
(0.08) 
0.000 
(0.11) 
0.000 
(0.06) 
- -0.000 
(-0.00) 
Timet 0.002 
(4.52)*** 
0.003 
(4.99)*** 
0.001 
(5.38)*** 
0.002 
(4.52)*** 
0.002 
(4.60)*** 
0.002 
(5.11)*** 
0.002 
(5.20)*** 
0.002 
(6.54)*** 
0.002 
(4.60)*** 
- 
Country FE Yes yes no no yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time FE No yes no yes no no no no no no 
N 3904 3904 3904 3904 3904 4079 3904 3904 3904 3904 
R
2
 0.16 0.18 0.06 0.07 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.14 
Note: t-statistics based on clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis in parenthesis. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
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Table 3. The contemporaneous effect of social conflicts on output-OLS 
 
 Full Sample Excluding 
AE 
Excluding 
CEE 
Excluding 
CIS 
Excluding 
DA 
Excluding 
LAC 
Excluding 
MENA 
Excluding 
SSA 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) 
St -0.011 
(-3.87)*** 
-0.013 
(-3.83)*** 
-0.011 
(-3.68)*** 
-0.011 
(-3.62)*** 
-0.013 
(-3.70)*** 
-0.013 
(-3.81)*** 
-0.009 
(-3.96)*** 
-0.009 
(-2.69)*** 
         
yt-1 -0.077 
(-4.35)*** 
-0.075 
(-4.06)*** 
-0.073 
(-4.22)*** 
-0.077 
(-4.27)*** 
-0.079 
(-3.62)*** 
-0.077 
(-4.15)*** 
-0.067 
(-4.06)*** 
-0.100 
(-6.91)*** 
yt-1 0.094 
(1.89)* 
0.086 
(1.71)* 
0.080 
(1.59)* 
0.081 
(1.58) 
0.094 
(1.72)* 
0.083 
(1.52) 
0.159 
(3.88)*** 
0.070 
(1.05) 
yt-2 0.022 
(0.61) 
0.019 
(0.50) 
0.015 
(0.40) 
0.014 
(0.36) 
0.036 
(0.90) 
0.026 
(0.75) 
0.039 
(1.30) 
-0.018 
(0.60) 
IPt -0.001 
(-0.14) 
-0.002 
(-0.17) 
-0.004 
(-0.40) 
-0.004 
(-0.38 
-0.002 
(-0.14) 
-0.002 
(-0.20) 
-0.005 
(-0.45) 
0.012 
(1.30) 
Opent 0.013 
(1.16) 
0.013 
(1.09) 
0.010 
(0.82) 
0.014 
(1.14) 
0.016 
(1.01) 
0.019 
(1.39) 
0.014 
(1.18) 
0.008 
(1.10) 
Popgt 0.000 
(0.12) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
0.000 
(0.08) 
0.001 
(0.13) 
0.001 
(0.21) 
0.007 
(1.45) 
-0.004 
(-1.74)* 
Timet 0.002 
(4.52)*** 
0.002 
(4.87)*** 
0.002 
(4.51)*** 
0.002 
(4.35)*** 
0.002 
(3.78)*** 
0.002 
(4.09)*** 
0.002 
(3.84)*** 
0.003 
(5.97)*** 
N 3904 3200 3695 3742 3324 3136 3467 2860 
R
2
 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.18 
Note: t-statistics based on clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis in parenthesis. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
AE=Advanced Economies; CEE=Central and Eastern European Countries; CIS=Commonwealth of Independent States; DA=Developing Asia; MENA= Middle 
East and North Africa; SSA=Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Table 4. The contemporaneous effect of social conflicts on output-OLS 
 
 Political Instability Demonstrations Political instability & 
Demonstrations 
Adverse 
Regime 
 CC GC RI1 RI2 RI3 GS DE PC WI AD 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X) 
St -0.011 
(-
3.87)*** 
-0.021 
(-
3.39)*** 
-0.006 
(-
4.19)*** 
-0.008 
(-
4.46)*** 
-0.006 
(-
4.19)*** 
-0.006 
(-2.45)** 
-0.003 
(-
3.37)*** 
-0.005 
(-3.92)*** 
-0.005 
(-
3.53)*** 
-0.070 
(-
3.37)*** 
           
yt-1 -0.077 
(-
4.35)*** 
-0.072 
(-
4.37)*** 
-0.077 
(-
4.33)*** 
-0.077 
(-
4.29)*** 
-0.074 
(-
4.23)*** 
-0.072 
(-
4.39)*** 
-0.073 
(-
4.38)*** 
-0.073 
(-4.29)*** 
-0.073 
(-
4.28)*** 
-0.078 
(-
4.38)*** 
yt-1 0.094 
(1.89)* 
0.104 
(2.23)** 
0.093 
(1.87)* 
0.091 
(1.82)* 
0.096 
(2.31)** 
0.106 
(2.26)* 
0.106 
(2.26)** 
0.105 
(2.27)** 
0.105 
(2.26)** 
0.102 
(2.10)** 
yt-2 0.022 
(0.61) 
0.029 
(0.95) 
0.022 
(0.61) 
0.023 
(0.65) 
0.020 
(0.52) 
0.032 
(1.02) 
0.033 
(1.05) 
0.030 
(0.99) 
0.031 
(1.01) 
0.022 
(0.87) 
IPt -0.001 
(-0.14) 
-0.001 
(-0.28) 
-0.000 
(-0.08) 
-0.000 
(-0.06) 
-0.000 
(-0.08) 
-0.001 
(-0.06) 
-0.003 
(-0.10) 
-0.001 
(-0.18) 
-0.000 
(-0.11) 
-0.000 
(-0.02) 
Opent 0.013 
(1.16) 
0.014 
(1.39) 
0.014 
(1.18) 
0.013 
(1.15) 
0.014 
(1.19) 
0.014 
(1.40) 
0.014 
(1.43) 
0.013 
(1.24) 
0.013 
(1.25) 
0.017 
(1.72)* 
Popgt 0.000 
(0.12) 
0.000 
(0.05) 
0.000 
(0.13) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
0.000 
(0.05) 
0.001 
(0.15) 
0.001 
(0.13) 
0.000 
(0.10) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
-0.000 
(-0.03) 
Timet 0.002 
(4.52)*** 
0.002 
(4.11)*** 
0.002 
(4.51)*** 
0.002 
(4.38)*** 
0.002 
(4.17)*** 
0.002 
(4.06)*** 
0.002 
(4.06)*** 
0.002 
(3.91)*** 
0.002 
(3.95)*** 
0.002 
(4.04)*** 
N 3904 4461 3904 3898 3848 4461 4460 4456 4456 4507 
R
2
 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 
Note: t-statistics based on clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
CC=cabinet changes; GC= government crises; RI1= regime instability index 1; RI2= regime instability index 2; RI3= regime instability index 3; PC= principal 
component indicator of political instability; WI=weighted index of political instability; GS= General Strikes; DE= Antigovernment demonstrations; AD=adverse 
regime change.  
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Table 5. The contemporaneous effect of social conflicts on output-GMM 
 
 Political Instability Demonstrations Political instability & 
Demonstrations 
Adverse 
Regime 
 CC GC RI1 RI2 RI3 GS DE PC WI AD 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X) 
St -0.017 
(-4.20)*** 
-0.027 
(-3.37)*** 
-0.009 
(-4.23)*** 
-0.011 
(-4.63)*** 
-0.009 
(-4.38)*** 
-0.002 
(-0.82) 
-0.002 
(-1.60)* 
-0.006 
(-2.93)*** 
-0.005 
(-2.83)*** 
-0.092 
(-3.23)*** 
           
yt-1 -0.003 
(-0.83) 
-0.005 
(-1.78)* 
-0.001 
(-0.47) 
-0.004 
(-1.19) 
-0.002 
(-0.53) 
-0.005 
(-1.61)* 
-0.005 
(-1.67)* 
-0.006 
(-1.71)* 
-0.006 
(-1.94)* 
-0.011 
(-3.22)*** 
yt-1 0.124 
(2.35)** 
0.142 
(2.95)*** 
0.122 
(2.33)** 
0.119 
(2.29)** 
0.128 
(2.89)*** 
0.145 
(2.93)*** 
0.144 
(2.97)** 
0.143 
(2.84)*** 
0.140 
(2.88)*** 
0.134 
(2.61)*** 
yt-2 0.038 
(1.14) 
0.047 
(1.52) 
0.039 
(1.07) 
0.040 
(1.20) 
0.040 
(1.11) 
0.051 
(1.61)* 
0.053 
(1.66)* 
0.050 
(1.61)* 
0.050 
(1.61)* 
0.037 
(1.47) 
IPt -0.003 
(-0.49) 
-0.003 
(-1.13) 
-0.002 
(-0.35) 
-0.004 
(-0.65) 
-0.004 
(-0.64) 
-0.001 
(-0.64) 
-0.001 
(-0.49) 
-0.002 
(-0.86) 
-0.002 
(-0.63) 
-0.002 
(-0.49) 
Opent 0.027 
(3.01)*** 
0.023 
(2.69)*** 
0.026 
(3.00)*** 
0.024 
(2.89)*** 
0.023 
(2.81)*** 
0.028 
(3.39)*** 
0.030 
(3.46)*** 
0.023 
(2.75)*** 
0.024 
(2.70)*** 
0.033 
(4.08)*** 
Popgt -0.004 
(-1.28) 
-0.005 
(-1.62)* 
-0.004 
(-1.32) 
-0.005 
(-1.52) 
-0.005 
(-1.33) 
-0.004 
(-1.28) 
-0.004 
(-1.29) 
-0.004 
(-1.32) 
-0.004 
(-1.26) 
-0.005 
(-2.09)** 
Timet 0.001 
(2.42)** 
0.000 
(1.21) 
0.001 
(2.48)** 
0.001 
(2.28)** 
0.001 
(2.25)** 
0.000 
(0.88) 
0.000 
(0.61) 
0.000 
(0.79) 
0.000 
(0.80) 
0.000 
(0.89) 
N 3904 4461 3904 3898 3848 4461 4461 4456 4456 4507 
Hansen 2 173.72 176.12 174.38 173.91 173.47 177.10 177.60 178.30 177.67 178.37 
AR(1) -3.81*** -4.07*** -3.81*** -3.89*** -4.56*** -3.94*** -3.94*** -3.96*** -3.98*** -4.05*** 
AR(2) -0.89 -0.85 -0.92 -0.95 -0.89 -0.93 -0.95 -0.90 -0.92 -0.68 
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
GMM-System Estimator: Two-step using Windmeijer standard errors, Population growth and Time trend as predetermined, other control variables 
considered as endogenous (instrumented using up to 2 lags).  
CC=cabinet changes; GC= government crises; RI1= regime instability index 1; RI2= regime instability index 2; RI3= regime instability index 3; 
PC= principal component indicator of political instability; WI=weighted index of political instability; GS= General Strikes; DE= Antigovernment 
demonstrations; AD=adverse regime change.  
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Table 6. Governance and probability of instability episodes 
 
 Cabinet Changes Adverse Regime Changes 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (X) 
Governance t -0.028 
(-4.71)*** 
-0.022 
(-2.57)*** 
-0.027 
(-3.98)*** 
-0.005 
(-7.23)*** 
-0.002 
(-2.03)** 
-0.003 
(-3.76)*** 
       
Polarization t  0.023 
(0.91) 
  0.001 
(0.59) 
 
Fractionalization t  0.224 
(3.80)*** 
0.1883 
(4.22)*** 
 0.001 
 (0.20) 
 
Margin majority t  -0.223 
(-3.80)*** 
-0.188 
(-4.22)*** 
 -0.001 
(-0.19) 
 
Opposition share t  -0.001 
(-0.68) 
  -0.000 
(-0.80) 
 
System t  -0.000 
(-0.99) 
  -0.000 
(-1.89)* 
 
Autocracy t  -0.004 
(-2.95)*** 
-0.002 
(-2.05)** 
 -0.001 
(-6.53)*** 
-0.001 
(-7.56)*** 
Middle-type regime t  0.063 
(1.45) 
  0.008 
(2.59)*** 
0.011 
(3.22)*** 
N-observations 1381 1032 1194 1952 1417 1717 
%-instability episodes 37 37 37 2 2 2 
% instability episodes (% non-instability 
episodes) correctly classified  
75 (34) 67(47) 74(40) 83(73) 81(84) 83(83) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.21 0.39 0.37 
2 22.17*** 43.95*** 35.47*** 52.32*** 104.28*** 140.55 
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 7. The effect of induced political instability on output 
 (I)^ (II) (III) (IV) 
Adverse regime changes t -0.059 
(-2.29)** 
 
 
 
 
 
Induced regime changes t  -0.561 
(-2.70)*** 
-0.107 
(-1.91)* 
 
Non-induced regime changes t    -0.054 
(-2.00)** 
Governance t   0.020 
(3.59)*** 
 
yt-1 -0.167 
(-7.57)*** 
-0.168 
(-7.71)*** 
-0.172 
(-7.59)*** 
-0.167 
(-7.53)*** 
yt-1 0.098 
(2.01)** 
0.089 
(1.81)* 
0.080 
(1.56) 
0.099 
(2.05)** 
yt-2 0.050 
(1.29) 
0.045 
(1.10) 
0.039 
(0.98) 
0.052 
(1.33) 
IPt 0.002 
(0.74) 
0.001 
(0.20) 
0.002 
(0.63) 
0.002 
(0.79) 
Opent 0.005 
(0.33) 
-0.001 
(-0.07) 
-0.006 
(-0.34) 
0.005 
(0.33) 
Popgt 0.009 
(2.59)*** 
0.009 
(2.71)*** 
0.008 
(2.47)** 
0.009 
(2.60)*** 
Timet 0.005 
(6.04)*** 
0.005 
(6.26)*** 
0.005 
(6.33)*** 
0.005 
(6.01)*** 
     
N 1917 1917 1689 1917 
R2 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.28 
Note: t-statistics based on clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively. ^ Baseline regression based on a sample for which governance data are available.
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Figure 1. Evolution of cabinet changes across regions 
 
 
 
AE=Advanced Economies; CEE=Central and Eastern European Countries; CIS=Commonwealth of 
Independent States; DA=Developing Asia; MENA= Middle East and North Africa; SSA=Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Figure 2. Co-movement of different social instability indicators 
 
 
 
CC=cabinet changes; GC= government crises; PC= principal component indicator of political instability; RI1= 
regime instability index 1; RI2= regime instability index 2; RI3= regime instability index 3; AD= adverse 
regime change. 
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Figure 3. Contemporaneous growth and cabinet changes  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Medium-term output changes and cabinet changes  
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Figure 5. The dynamic effect of cabinet changes on output (percentage points) 
 
 
 
Note: The solid line represents the estimated IRF; dotted lines represent 95% confidence bands. Time (in years) 
on the x axis. 
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Figure 6. The dynamic effect of cabinet changes on output (percentage points) - Robustness check 
 
 
A. Baseline     B. Time Fixed Effects    C. No Time Trends  
   
 
 
       D. Country Specific Time Trends  E. No Country Fixed Effects                 F. GMM 
   
Note: The solid line represents the estimated IRF; dotted lines represent 95% confidence bands. Time (in years) on the x axis.  
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Figure 7. The dynamic effect of cabinet changes on output (percentage points) - Robustness check 
 
 
A.  Baseline           B. Excluding AE         C. Excluding CEE          D. Excluding CIS 
    
 
         E. Excluding DA             F. Excluding LAC     G. Excluding MENA      H. Excluding SSA 
 
 
  
Note: The solid line represents the estimated IRF; dotted lines represent 95% confidence bands. Time (in years) on the x axis.  
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Figure 8. The dynamic effect of social instability indicators on output (percentage 
points)  
 
 
Panel A. Regime Instability Index 1 
 
 
 
Panel B. Adverse Regime Changes 
 
 
 
Note: The solid line represents the estimated IRF; dotted lines represent 95% confidence bands. Time (in years) 
on the x axis. 
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Figure 9. The dynamic effect of cabinet changes conditioning for reforms in governance 
(percentage points)  
 
Panel A. Reform within 2 years 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Reform within 3 years 
 
 
Note: Improvement (deterioration) in governance corresponds to the third (first) quartile of the distribution of 
the changes in the composite governance. Marked points () indicate that the interaction term (and the overall 
impact) is statistically significant at least at 10%. 
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Figure 10. The dynamic effect of social instability conditioning for reforms in 
governance –within 2 years (percentage points)  
 
Panel A. Regime instability index 1 
 
 
 
Panel B. Adverse regime change  
 
 
Note: Improvement (deterioration) in governance corresponds to the third (first) quartile of the distribution of 
the changes in the composite governance. Marked points () indicate that the interaction term (and the overall 
impact) is statistically significant at least at 10%. 
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Figure 11. The dynamic effect of cabinet changes conditioning for reforms in 
governance (percentage points)-Instrumental Variables 
 
Panel A. Reform within 2 years 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Reform within 3 years 
 
 
Note: Improvement (deterioration) in governance corresponds to the third (first) quartile of the distribution of 
the changes in the composite governance. Marked points () indicate that the interaction term (and the overall 
impact) is statistically significant at least at 10%. 
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Appendix  
The composite indicator of product market flexibility considered in the analysis is the one 
provided by the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) and rates 
countries between 0 and 10, with higher scores being assigned to economies with better 
(more flexible) regulations. The indicator is based on the following sub-components: i) Price 
controls; ii) Administrative requirements; iii) Bureaucracy costs; iv) the Cost of starting a 
business; v) Extra payments / bribes; vi) Licensing restrictions; and vii) the Cost of tax 
compliance. The composite indicator of labor market flexibility considered in the analysis is 
also obtained from the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) and rates 
countries between 0 and 10, based on the following sub-components: i) Hiring regulations 
and minimum wage; ii) Hiring and firing regulations; iii) Centralized collective bargaining; 
iv) Hours regulations; v) Mandated cost of worker dismissal; and vi) Conscription. 
The results obtained estimating equation (3) using the product market flexibility 
indicator are shown in Figure A1. Looking at the figure, it emerges that the response of 
output to social conflict over the medium-term is a function of product market flexibility. In 
particular, the results suggest that seven years after the occurrence of a social instability 
episode, the contraction in output is about 2 percent larger in countries where product market 
flexibility has decreased than in countries where flexibility has increased. 
Similarly, the results obtained for reforms in the labor market suggest that the 
response of output to social conflict over the medium-term is also a function of labor market 
flexibility (Figure A2). However, reforms in labor market seem to be less efficient than 
reforms in governance and product market flexibility in boosting output over the medium-
term. In particular, the results show that in order for medium-term output to be higher than 
 38 
 
 
pre-crisis levels, reforms implemented in the labor market have to be of a larger-scale than 
those in governance or the product market. In addition, while reforms in product market 
flexibility and governance tend to have significant effects after 5 years of the occurrence of 
the social instability episode, labor market reforms have significant effects only after seven 
years.  
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Figure A1. The dynamic effect of cabinet changes conditioning for reforms in product 
markets (percentage points)  
 
Panel A. Reform within 2 year 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Reform within 3 year 
 
 
Note: Improvement (decrease) in product market flexibility corresponds to the third (first) quartile of the 
distribution of the changes in the composite indicator. Marked points () indicate that the interaction term (and 
the overall impact) is statistically significant at least at 10%. 
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Figure A2. The dynamic effect of cabinet changes conditioning for reforms in labor 
markets (percentage points)  
 
Panel A. Reform within 2 year 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Reform within 3 year 
 
Note: Improvement (decrease) in labor market flexibility corresponds to the third (first) quartile of the 
distribution of the changes in the composite indicator. Marked points () indicate that the interaction term (and 
the overall impact) is statistically significant at least at 10%. 
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